What threat from China do you think drives your service’s (U.S. Navy) planning documents in Module 2 the most?

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Cover image, Russian tanks, model T90A. Source: Shutterstock.

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PREFACE For more than 50 years, DIA officers have met the full range of security challenges facing our great nation. Our intelligence professionals operate across the globe, and our work supports customers from the forward-deployed warfighter to the national policymaker. DIA is united in a common vision—to be the indispensable source of defense intelligence expertise—and for the past five decades we have done just that.

As part of this vision, DIA has a long history of producing comprehensive and authoritative defense intelligence overviews. In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a complete and accurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public for the first time.

Today, we are faced with a complexity of intelligence challenges from multiple threats that we cannot afford to misunderstand. In the spirit of Soviet Military Power, DIA is proud to produce an unclassified defense intelligence overview of the military capabilities associated with the challenges we face—beginning with Russia. This product is intended to foster a dialogue between U.S. leaders, the national security community, partner nations, and the public about the challenges we face in the 21st century.

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The international order established after the Second World War and developed throughout the Cold War largely ensured widespread peace and stability even as it saw new conflicts—large and small—take place in different regions of the world. This post-war era, underwritten primarily by the strength of the United States, also gave rise to the greatest period of prosperity in history, witnessing countries rebuild from war and emerge from colonialism to become vibrant and valuable members of the international community. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as a world leader militarily, economically and diplomatically. Today, however, the United States faces an increasingly complex array of challenges to our national security.

The resurgence of Russia on the world stage—seizing the Crimean Peninsula, destabilizing eastern Ukraine, intervening on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and shaping the information environment to suit its interests—poses a major challenge to the United States. Moscow will continue to aggressively pursue its foreign policy and security objectives by employing the full spectrum of the state’s capabilities. Its powerful military, coupled with the actual or perceived threat of intervention, allows its whole-of-government efforts to resonate widely.

Russia continues to modernize its extensive nuclear forces and is developing long range precision-guided conventional weapons systems. It is manipulating the global information environment, employing tools of indirect action against countries on its periphery and using its military for power projection and expeditionary force deployments far outside its borders. Its ultimate deterrent is a robust nuclear force capable of conducting a massed nuclear strike on targets in the United States within minutes.

Within the next decade, an even more confident and capable Russia could emerge. The United States needs to anticipate, rather than react, to Russian actions and pursue a greater awareness of Russian goals and capabilities to prevent potential conflicts. Our policymakers and commanders must have a complete understanding of Russia’s military capabilities, especially as U.S. and Russian forces may increasingly encounter each other around the globe. DIA will continue to provide our leaders decision-space, ensuring they have the time and information necessary to protect our nation. The wrong decisions—or the right ones made too late—could have dire consequences.

This report examines a resurgent Russia’s military power to foster a deeper understanding of its core capabilities, goals, and aspirations in the 21st Century.

Vincent R . Stewart Lieutenant General , USMC Director Defense Intel l igence Agency

Vladimir Putin’s address to the Russian Federal Assembly following the referendum on annexation of Crimea, 18 March, 2014:

“The USA prefers to follow the rule of the strongest and not by the international law. They are convinced that they have been chosen and they are exceptional, that they are allowed to shape the destiny of the world, that it is only them that can be right. They act as they please. Here and there they use force against sovereign states, set up coalitions in accordance with the principle: who is not with us is against us.”

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Introduction/Historical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 1991–Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Russian National Military Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Russia’s Threat Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

National Security Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Stability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

External Defense Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Russian Perceptions of Modern Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Military and Security Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Main Operations Directorate 25

National Military Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Russian Nuclear Command and Control 26 Command and Control of Joint Forces 27

Core Russian Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Nuclear Forces and Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Biological and Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Anti-Access/Area Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Information Operations 32 Strategic Air Operations 32 Integrated Air Defense System 33 Modern Precision Strike Capabilities 33

CONTENTS

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Precision Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Space/Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Propaganda Helps Shape The Information Environment 38 Cyber-Enabled Psychological Operations 39 Information Defense 40 Media Laws—A Hedge Against Instability 41

Indirect Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Underground Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Denial and Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Outlook: A Modernizing Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Appendix A: Russian Strategic Rocket Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Appendix B: Russian Ground Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Appendix C: Russian Aerospace Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Appendix D: Russian Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Appendix E: Russian Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Appendix F: Russian Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Appendix G: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs . . . . . . . . . . 75

Appendix H: Arms Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

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Introduction/Historical Overview 1991-Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military

ollowing the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Russian Federation inher- ited several formidable tasks and chal-

lenges from its Soviet predecessor. For the new- ly-formed Russian Ministry of Defense, the most immediate challenge was to relocate military equipment and personnel from the newly inde- pendent states of the former USSR and coun- tries of the disbanded Warsaw Pact into a new Russian state.1 The assets of the Soviet Union’s

nuclear arsenal were of particular importance. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the four states with nuclear weapons in their territory, eventually reached an agreement to dismantle all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in the non-Russian republics or return them to Russia.2 The issue of conventional mili- tary forces was much more problematic. Forces returning from Eastern Europe had to be rein- tegrated into the new Russian military, while

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Kremlin Guards in 2017. Military power has always been regarded as of critical importance by Russian and Soviet leaders, but after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was left with a dramatically weakened military.

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those in the newly independent states were viewed as the basis for building national mili- taries for new sovereign countries.3

Returning military forces from Eastern Europe were often shipped piecemeal back to unprepared bases in the Russian Feder- ation.4 Other units located in the territory of the former Soviet Union were absorbed by the newly independent states. In certain cases, units such as the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine or the 14th Army in Moldova actively resisted the attempts by the Soviet successor states to absorb these forces. Some of these stranded units became embroiled in ethnic conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan.5 Most sig- nificantly for the new Russian military, inte- rior military districts, which under the Soviet Union contained low-readiness mobilization forces such as the Moscow and North Cauca- sus Military Districts, now became “front-line” districts bordering foreign states.6 The Rus- sian Federation emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union with a much smaller military and an entirely new set of security challenges.7

Russia’s new military faced dramatic budget- ary, readiness, and personnel shortfalls, as well as uncertainty of its role as Moscow strug- gled to determine its place in the post-Cold War world.8, 9 Russia cut military spending drasti- cally during the decade of post-Soviet economic turbulence. Fielding of new weapons systems slowed to a trickle and eventually halted; the huge former Soviet arms industry struggled, focusing on gaining hard currency by selling its most modern weapons to foreign buyers.10 At the same time, Russian military units lacked

funding and fuel to train and exercise, and pay was often months in arrears. The readiness of the force was minimal, and the popular image of the Russian military of the 1990s remains ships rusting at pier side, pilots unable to fly, and Russian officers moonlighting with second jobs to make ends meet.11

Moscow also had difficulty manning its mil- itary. Press reports on military life that began to appear during the glasnost (openness) era of the late 1980s highlighted the harshness of the conscript’s lot, and in particular the brutal and sometimes deadly dedovschina hazing of new draftees. Draft evasion became endemic, with many young Russian men using any and all legal or illegal measures to avoid military service.12, 13

Troops gathered around a fire for warmth during the Chechen conflict; the difficulties Moscow’s weakened military faced during its operations against the sep- aratist republic underscored its deterioration during the 1990s.

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Russian generals voiced complaints about the poor quality of the conscripts they actually received, as they were often unhealthy, poorly educated, and sometimes arrived with crimi- nal records.14 The military’s most painful trial, however, was caused by insurgency within the borders of the Russian Federation. From 1994 to 1995, undermanned and poorly trained Russian forces struggled to take and secure the breakaway Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus.15 The military’s problems and lim- itations were widely publicized by the Russian and international press, further undermin- ing its reputation and reinforcing the desire of young Russians to avoid service.

Throughout the post-Soviet era, there was a recognized need to reform and modernize the military.16 Not only did the Russian mili- tary suffer from the readiness and manpower

shortfalls outlined above, but Moscow’s forces retained their cumbersome Soviet-era organi- zation, designed for the mobilization of mas- sive numbers of reservists to conduct deep mechanized theater operations in the context of a major war.17 The 1990s and first decade of the 21st century saw a series of military reform efforts announced, discussed, and only abort- ively implemented. Russia’s first Minister of Defense, General Pavel Grachev, (1992–1996) posited the creation of a fully manned and equipped small “mobile force” component that could rapidly move to a conflict area and hold the line until additional forces mobilized;18, 19, 20

Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev (1997–2001) created a new strategic nuclear deterrence force based on his previous service, the Strate- gic Rocket Forces;21, 22 and Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov (2001–2007) and Chief of the General Staff Yuriy Baluyevsky (2004–2008) pushed for the establishment of new regional theater commands and filling the military’s ranks with professional “contract” person- nel.23, 24 By the late 2000s, these reform plans remained largely unimplemented, unsuccess- ful, or abandoned.

One arguable exception to this series of mil- itary reform failures was the effort during the late 1990s to create “permanently ready forces,” a subset of the Russian force struc- ture made up of units with better manning and equipment levels.25, 26 These units were created and used during the second Chechen conflict (1999–2004) and enabled Moscow to intervene more rapidly and with more capa- ble forces than during the first Chechen War (1994–1995).27

Russian SS-25 ICBM launcher; given the weakened state of its conventional forces in the years after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow prioritized the mainte- nance of its nuclear capabilities.

Image Source: Shutterstock

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Despite modest improvements and a measure of success in the second Chechen conflict, the Russian military still entered the first decade of the 21st century with a Soviet-era mobiliza- tion force structure almost completely equipped with dated Soviet-era equipment. Shortfalls in modern command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment and capa- bilities were particularly notable. Russian mil- itary limitations were fully on display during the August 2008 “five-day war” with Georgia.28

Russian forces prevailed and defeated their rel- atively weak Georgian opponents, but after-ac- tion analysis by the Russian military high- lighted many failings. Air and artillery strikes missed their targets, an army commander had to resort to a cell phone to contact a higher headquarters,29 and several aircraft were lost to Georgian air defenses. While internationally

Transition to the New Look Program

Moscow’s limitations in modernizing its military had led to heavy dependence on its aging nuclear forces to defend the state. But while the presence of a robust nuclear deterrent dissuaded potential aggressors from directly attacking the Russian Federation, it was not flexible enough for Moscow to use in small, local conflicts such as Georgia or as a tool of power projection. The New Look program was a comprehensive and massive effort, aimed to change the Russian military from a Cold War-style mobilization force to a more ready, modern, and professional military able to respond to 21st century conflicts.30 Par- tially-manned Soviet-style divisions were reorganized into what were planned to be ful- ly-manned brigades; officer ranks were trimmed from 350,000 billets to initially 150,000, although later the number rose to 220,000; the contract manning effort was reshaped and reinvigorated, with a goal of 425,000 professional enlisted personnel in the force by 2017;31 the six extant military districts were reshaped initially into four joint strategic commands, which controlled all military assets in their areas in peace and war; and lastly, a massive state armaments program was initiated, allocating 1.1 trillion rubles over 10 years, aiming at fielding a Russian military with 70% new or modernized equipment by 2020.32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37

Minister of Defense Shoygu at the 2014 Victory Day Parade; since 2012, Shoygu has presided over the continued modernization of the Russian military as well as its operations in Ukraine and Syria.

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many were impressed by the ability of the Russian military, so derelict in the 1990s, to accomplish its mission, Moscow was spurred by what it viewed as critical shortfalls in Geor- gia to rapidly push forward a whole new set of reforms—known as the “New Look”—which had been under discussion before the conflict.38

The New Look was controversial and painful for many in or associated with the Russian military establishment.39, 40, 41 Even military education and medical support organiza- tions became targets for major reductions. In late 2012, the unpopular Minister of Defense associated with the reform effort, Anatoliy Serdyukov, left office and the former head of the Emergency Situations Ministry, Sergey Shoygu, took over.42 Shoygu proved adept at easing some of the most unpopular aspects of the New Look while largely retaining and refining the essence of the reform program.43

The years of Shoygu’s tenure have seen the New Look military engaged in a series of active operations. In early 2014, Russian naval infan- try, special forces, and airborne troops rapidly seized control of the Crimean Peninsula.44 While they faced almost no opposition, the operation gave the world its first look at a mil- itary that appeared surprisingly disciplined and well-equipped for those whose image of

Russian forces was formed during the years of decay in the 1990s. Although their presence was denied by Moscow, Russian special forces and troops operated to mobilize, lead, equip, and support separatist militias in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine from spring 2014 to the present. Ukrainian forces have stressed the capabilities of the Russian-enabled sepa- ratist units, especially with respect to C4ISR, artillery firepower, and air defense.45, 46 In Sep- tember 2015, Moscow launched its first expedi- tionary operation since the Soviet era, deploy- ing fixed-wing and helicopter aviation assets to Syria. Combined with other military support to the Asad regime such as intelligence infor- mation, advisors, ammunition, and artillery, Russian action arrested the decline in the Syrian regime’s military position.47

The Russian military today is on the rise—not as the same Soviet force that faced the West in the Cold War, dependent on large units with heavy equipment, but as a smaller, more mobile, balanced force rapidly becoming capa- ble of conducting the full range of modern war- fare. It is a military that can intervene in coun- tries along Russia’s periphery or as far away as the Middle East. The new Russian military is a tool that can be used to underpin Moscow’s stated ambitions of being a leading force in a multipolar world.

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Russia National Military Overview Russia’s Threat Perceptions

Russia has established five Joint Strategic Commands (Obyedinennoye Strategicheskoye Komandovaniye – OSK) to deal with perceived threats from the west, south, east, and Arctic.48

Russian Joint Strategic Commands 1612-11168

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ince returning to power in 2012, Rus- sian President Putin has sought to reassert Russia as a great power on

the global stage and to restructure an interna- tional order that the Kremlin believes is tilted

too heavily in favor of the United States at Russia’s expense.49 Moscow seeks to promote a multi-polar world predicated on the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-inter- ference in other states’ internal affairs, the

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primacy of the United Nations, and a careful balance of power preventing one state or group of states from dominating the international order.50 To support these great power ambi- tions, Moscow has sought to build a robust military able to project power, add credibility to Russian diplomacy, and ensure that Rus- sian interests can no longer be summarily dis- missed without consequence.51

Russia’s assertive promotion of its national interests, punctuated by its military actions in Ukraine and Syria, demonstrates a more con- fident and somewhat less risk averse Kremlin, but it also has revived international concerns about the re-emergence of a more militaristic Russia. Russian military forces played a key role in the seizure of Crimea and fomenting an artificial separatist revolt in eastern Ukraine, blunting Kyiv’s aspirations to join NATO, at least for the foreseeable future.52 Addition- ally, Russia’s military intervention in Syria has changed the entire dynamic of the conflict, bolstering the Asad regime and ensuring that no resolution to the conflict is possible with- out Moscow’s agreement. Nevertheless, these actions also belie a deeply entrenched sense of insecurity regarding a United States that Mos- cow believes is intent on undermining Russia at home and abroad.53

Moscow undoubtedly views the United States and its NATO partners as the principle threat to Russian security, its geo-political ambitions, and most importantly, the Kremlin’s contin- ued hold on power. This perception of vul- nerability vis-à-vis the United States is most clearly evident in the latest Russian National

Security Strategy published in December 2015. The document identifies the United States and its NATO allies as Russia’s main threat, and accuses the West of pursuing a deliberate pol- icy of containment against Russia to sustain its domination of the post-Cold War interna- tional order and deprive Moscow of its rightful place on the world stage.54, 55 It explicitly states, “the Russian Federation's implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance in world affairs.” The security strategy also cites the buildup of NATO mili- tary capabilities closer to the Russian border, the deployment of U.S. missile defense capabil- ities in Europe, and the ongoing U.S. pursuit of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon sys- tems as a serious threat to Russian security.56

Russia also has a deep and abiding distrust of U.S. efforts to promote democracy around the world and what it perceives as a U.S. campaign to impose a single set of global values. Moscow worries that U.S. attempts to dictate a set of acceptable international norms threatens the foundations of Kremlin power by giving license for foreign meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. The December 2015 National Security Strategy warns of the importance of preserving tradi- tional Russian spiritual and cultural values against foreign Western ideas and influences aimed at undermining Russia from within.57 The Kremlin is convinced the United States is laying the groundwork for regime change in Russia, a conviction further reinforced by the events in Ukraine. Moscow views the United States as the critical driver behind the crisis in

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Ukraine and the Arab Spring and believes that the overthrow of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych is the latest move in a long-es- tablished pattern of U.S.-orchestrated regime change efforts, including the Kosovo campaign, Iraq, Libya, and the 2003–05 “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.58

Russian threat perceptions are not limited to the United States, and Moscow views the danger posed by Islamic militants and terrorists with grave concern.59 The Kremlin is particu